Technology adoption in a community of heterogeneous education level: Who are your good neighbors? by Yusuke Ono
Technology adoption in a community of heterogeneous




This paper examines the role of education in technology adoption in a multi-agent finite-time
dynamic game setting. It is assumed that education decreases prior variance on the best
action in using a new technology in the target-input Bayesian model, experience accumulates
in a community (social learning; information spillover), and the experience, however, is not
transferrable from one technology to another. The paper shows that, depending on the
schooling distribution, the equilibrium creates different dynamic patterns of technology
adoption.
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In this study, we focus on a community where people with diﬀerent levels of
education decide whether or not to adopt new technologies. We mean two things
by the word of community. First, everyone faces the same environment in terms of
using technologies. Second, members in a community can observe the other mem-
ber’s activities and learn how to use the technologies; in other words, information
is somewhat shared. A member’s adoption of a technology therefore has inﬂuence
on the other members’ decisions.1 Highly educated people are supposed to be able
to guess well how to handle technologies.
Under these presuppositions, the improvement of the education level for some
members in a community may have inﬂuence on the technology adoption behaviors
in the whole community and the output level of the other members. These eﬀects
may be regarded as externalities of education. In our model, diﬀerent kinds of
externalities of education on output are found. They include negative externalities
as well as positive ones. Our model shows that those whose education level is low
are likely to undergo negative externalities.
In this paper, we use the target-input model which considers the eﬀects of
learning-by-doing and learning from others. In this respect, our model is simi-
lar to the model of Foster and Rosenzweig(1995) though the setting is unlike in
some regards.2 Since our interests are the inﬂuence of the neighbors’ education
level, we formulate the role of education in the context of the target-input model,
partly following the way of Rosenzweig(1995).
Jovanovic and Nyarko(1996) also examines learning-by-doing and the choice of
technology in the framework of the target-input model. However, the presupposi-
tions of our model are diﬀerent from those of theirs in some ways. For example, we
assume that agents dynamically optimize their output whereas agents are myopic
in the model of Jovanovic and Nyarko(1996). Further, education is not formulated
in Jovanovic and Nyarko(1996).
This paper consists of four sections and appendixes. In the next section, our
theoretical model is formulated. According to the model, technology adoption in a
community of heterogeneous education level is explored in section 3. The analysis
shows externalities of education on output. The last section concludes the paper.
All formal proofs are shown in appendix A. The social optimality of an equilibrium
is discussed in appendix B.
1Bardhan and Udry(1999) calls this “the externality generated by social learning”.
2For example, we consider a menu of technologies as Jovanovic and Nyarko(1996) does.
12. Model
Setting Economic agents are engaged in production activities in a community.
They are risk-neutral. They produce qnt(z), using technology n ∈ {0,1,...} with
input z in period t where qnt(z) = γn[1 − (ynt − z)2]. The framework on which
we are based is the target-input model.3 γ is a real value which is bigger than
1. The value of γ is known. ynt is the optimal level of input for technology n in
period t where ynt = θn + wnt. wnt is distributed as a normal random variable
with mean 0 and variance σ2
w < 1. wnt is independent over agents and periods.
The distribution of wnt is known and common to all the agents in the community.
The agents have priors over θn that are normal distributions with mean µ0 and
variance σ2
0. σ2
0 = 1/e where e is the agent’s education level, which is a positive
real value. The agents’ optimal choice for z is ˆ znt = Et(ynt) = Et(θn).
Et(qnt(ˆ znt)) = γ
n[1 − vart(θn) − σ
2
w].
In this setting, we examine a game with two players. The players are named
i and j. Their education levels are denoted by ei and ej. The game begins with
an adoption of a technology. Suppose that the level of this initial technology is 0.
After that, the game proceeds as follows:
(1) Each player produces with the ex ante optimal input level, ˆ znt. Suppose that
each player can know the input and output levels of all the players after their pro-
duction. Hence they know the true levels of optimal input and use the information
to update their beliefs about all the technologies used in their production.
(2) They decide simultaneously whether they adopt a new technology or not.
Adoption of a new technology increases the technology level by 1. Each player
knows the other player’s choice after their decisions.
(3) The step (1) and (2) are repeated once more.
(4) The step (1) is done again.
In this game, the players determine the adoption of a new technology twice.
Their objective is to maximize the discounted sum of expected output of produc-
tion for the three periods. In the ﬁrst period, they begin to produce with the initial
technology. After the ﬁrst production, they decide whether or not to adopt a new
technology. In the second period, they produce with the technologies selected by
the decisions of the ﬁrst period. After this second production, their second de-
cisions about technologies for the production of the third period are done. We
assume that the players act on a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium composed of
pure strategies.
3The production function in our model is the same as the one in Jovanovic and Nyarko(1996)
except that the latter allows n to take real values.
2Skills In our production function, the expected outcome with ˆ znt is γn[1 −
vart(θn) − σ2
w]. This value decreases with vart(θn). Hence vart(θn) reﬂects the





where xnt is the cumulative number of times prior to period t that technology n
is used for production.
In the setting of our model, people can learn how to use a technology if they use it
or if their neighbors do. All experience of using a technology is socially experienced
in the respect that information obtained by the experience is shared by all the
members. We assume that experience is not transferrable from one technology to
another. xnt reﬂects the accumulation of the social experience of using technology
n in the community up to period t. Individual skills for a technology are improved
by the social experience of using it. In fact, vart(θn) decreases with xnt.
In our model, education is a source of the skills, too. For all n and t, vart(θn)
decreases with e. Whereas xnt is beneﬁcial only for technology n, education is
useful for all the technologies. Literacy education is a good illustration of this.
Literate people can take advantage of documented information. Besides, they can
build a general framework for using technologies since the experience of reading
many books may accustom them to thinking in a theoretic manner. Thus literacy
may be eﬀective in using even the technologies which are not used before.
In the framework of the target-input model, two advantages of education are
formulated by Rosenzweig(1995). The ﬁrst one is the improvement of access to
information sources and the second one is that of the ability to decipher new
information. Our model follows Rosenzweig’s formulation about the ﬁrst one. On
the other hand, the second one is not formulated in our model. It follows from this
supposition that we consider the situation where it is easy to interpret information
obtained through production activities.




This declines with xnt; in other words, education is more valuable when the tech-
nology is new to the community. It is evident that xnt counts more when e is
small; that is, the social experience of using a technology is more important to less
educated people. xnt and e are supposed to be substitutes in our framework.4
4On the other hand, schooling and experience may be complements in the framework of
Rosenzweig(1995). The complementarity in the context of heterogeneous worker-ﬁrm matching
3Education Level and Technology Adoption Let r(n,x,e) denote the func-
tion of γn(1 − 1
e+x/σ2
w − σ2
w). An agent of education level e produces output level
r(n,x,e) when the agent uses technology n with the accumulation of the social
experience x. As for y > z, we deﬁne e(y,z) as the real value which satisﬁes both
r(n,y,e(y,z)) = r(n + 1,z,e(y,z)) and e(y,z) > −z/σ2
w. Although n is used for
the deﬁnition, e(y,z) does not depend on n.5 r(n + 1,z,e) increases more rapidly
with e than r(n,y,e) does. Hence, if e > e(y,z), r(n + 1,z,e) is bigger than
r(n,y,e) and if −z/σ2
w < e < e(y,z), r(n+1,z,e) is less than r(n,y,e). Evidently,
e(y,z) is increasing with y and decreasing with z.6
In our model, the more educated are more likely to adopt a new technology. This
is due to the assumption of the initial advantage of education in reducing prior
variance σ2
0; our speciﬁcation is σ2
0 = 1
e. If we assumed that the more educated were
able to obtain more information from each use of the technology, highly educated
people might stick to the old technology because of its advantage of accumulated
information. Whether or not the more educated are more likely to adopt a new
technology would depend on the balance between the initial advantage and the
learning advantage of education.
We assume that ei and ej are less than e(2,0). When both the players choose
their technologies at the ﬁrst period, they have already produced with the initial
is discussed in Yamauchi(2004). The complementarity is a plausible and interesting feature.
Nevertheless, we assume that schooling and experience are not complements but substitutes. The
reasons are as follows: First, assuming substitutability gives us clear and vital implications in our
model. Under substitutability between schooling and experience, experience is more important
to lowly educated people than highly educated people. Therefore lowly educated people are
likely to be damaged when they lose their experience accumulated in the initial technology. Our
discussions in this paper are based on this intuition. Second, the assumption makes our model
simple and computationally tractable. In our setting, education level aﬀects only initial prior
variance σ2
0 in a simple way. Third, assuming substitutability rather than complimentarity is
reasonable under some situations. For example, if the decipher of information obtained through
experience is easy enough, not assuming complimentarity is valid.














∂x > 0 and re(n,x,e) ≡
∂r(n,x,e)
∂e > 0. Since y > z,













re(n + 1,z,e) − re(n,y,e)
< 0.
4technology. Hence x02 is equal to 2. The players have to produce with no accumu-
lation of the social experience if they adopt a new technology; that is, x12 equal
to 0. Hence, the initial technology is desirable for those whose education level is
less than e(2,0). If they were myopic, they would never adopt a new technology
at the ﬁrst period. In our model, however, the players are assumed to optimize
their payoﬀs dynamically.
Let ki and kj denote players’ ﬁrst decisions where 1 means adoption, 0 no adop-
tion. Let (ki,kj) denote a subgame which starts at the second period after the
players’ ﬁrst decisions ki and kj. There are four subgames, (0,0), (1,0), (0,1) and
(1,1). The players’ second choices are functions from the set of the subgames to
{0,1}. We call the functions li and lj.
The dynamics of the social experience xnt are speciﬁed as follows:
x01 = 0, x02 = 2, x03 = 4 − ki − kj
x12 = 0, x13 = ki + kj
x23 = 0.
Let mi and mj denote technology levels for the third production;
mi = ki + li(ki,kj)
and
mj = kj + lj(ki,kj).
The objective functions of the players are
vi(ki,li;kj,ei) ≡ r(0,x01,ei) + δr(ki,xki2,ei) + δ
2r(mi,xmi3,ei)
and
vj(kj,lj;ki,ej) ≡ r(0,x01,ej) + δr(kj,xkj2,ej) + δ
2r(mj,xmj3,ej)
where δ is the players’ discount rate.
At the second period, player i’s second choice li(ki,kj) is determined in such
a way to maximize player i’s third production r(mi,xmi3,ei) where mi = ki +
li(ki,kj). This decision making depends on x03, x13 and x23, which are determined
by ki and kj. Hence, ki and kj dictate li(ki,kj) through the accumulation of the
social experience, xn3. Player i’s ﬁrst production r(0,x01,ei) is not aﬀected neither
ki nor kj and player i’s second production r(ki,xki2,ei) does not depend on kj. It
is therefore the existence of the third period that makes decision making dynamic
and strategic.
We solve the game by backward induction. We deﬁne l∗
i(ki,kj) as player i’s
second choice which maximizes player i’s third production given (ki,kj). It is
5meant by l∗
i(ki,kj) = 1 that player i should adopt a new technology at the subgame
(ki,kj). Player i should adopt a new technology if
r(ki,xki3,ei) < r(ki + 1,xki+1,3,ei).
Hence l∗
i(ki,kj) = 1 if ei > e(xki3,xki+1,3). For example, if (ki,kj) = (1,0), xki3 =
x13 = 1 and xki+1,3 = x23 = 0. Therefore l∗
i(1,0) = 1 if ei > e(1,0). If (ki,kj) =
(0,1), xki3 = x03 = 3 and xki+1,3 = x13 = 1, and therefore l∗
i(0,1) = 1 if ei > e(3,1).
If (ki,kj) = (0,0), xki3 = x03 = 4 and xki+1,3 = x13 = 0. If (ki,kj) = (1,1), xki3 =




i depends on ei but does not on ej. As for player j, l∗
j(ki,kj) = 1 if
ej > e(xkj3,xkj+1,3).
There is a threshold value of the education level for the adoption at the ﬁrst
period. A player with education level more than e∗
k should adopt a new technology
at the ﬁrst period, given the other player’s ﬁrst decision k ∈ {0,1}.7 The lemma
in appendix A shows the existence of e∗
k.
e∗
k depends on γ, σ2
w and δ. We provide a numerical example in this paragraph,
assuming γ = 1.04, σ2























0 ≈ 13.6721 and e∗






























w)2. The increase of δ implies that the future output
counts more. Technology adoption in the ﬁrst period increases the future output.
Therefore the increase of δ makes technology adoption more advantageous and












7A Player’s payoﬀ is aﬀected by the other player’s ﬁrst choice of the technology but is not
by the second choice. Hence, the threshold value does not depend on the other player’s second
decision and therefore does not on the other player’s schooling.



















The former is the future output increased by technology adoption. The increase
of δ strengthens this advantage of technology adoption. The latter denotes how
much e∗






















∂δ ≈ −1.43492 and
∂e∗
1
∂δ ≈ −3.31345; e∗
1 moves more sensitively with the
change of δ than e∗







w likewise.10 The diﬀerent
sensitivities of e∗
0 and e∗
1 to the change of γ, σ2





































where rγ ≡ ∂r
























































13.6721 > 13.6546 1.04 0.1 0.8
11.6463 < 11.8753 1.05 0.1 0.8
14.1244 < 14.4612 1.04 0.08 0.8
13.8266 < 13.9875 1.04 0.1 0.7
For example, this table shows that the increase of γ from 1.04 to 1.05 decreases e∗
0 more than
e∗
1 and thereby e∗
0 becomes less than e∗
1. The bold numbers in the table mean that they have
changed from γ = 1.04, σ2





1 has some implications. For example, if e∗
1 > e∗
0,
there is ei which satisﬁes e∗
1 > ei > e∗
0. At that time, player i should not adopt
a new technology if player j does, and player i should do if player j does not; in
other words, player j’s adoption discourages player i’s adoption.



















j) constitutes a SPNE depends on the distribution of ei and ej. There
is a SPNE with k∗
i = 0 and k∗
j = 0 if and only if ei ≤ e∗
0 and ej ≤ e∗
0, k∗
i = 1 and
k∗
j = 1 if and only if ei ≥ e∗
1 and ej ≥ e∗
1, k∗
i = 1 and k∗
j = 0 if and only if ei ≥ e∗
0
and ej ≤ e∗
1, and k∗
i = 0 and k∗
j = 1 if and only if ei ≤ e∗
1 and ej ≥ e∗
0.
Patterns of Technology Adoption in a Community We can denote each
player’s history of technology adoption over two periods by natural numbers,
{0,1,2,3}. A number ω contained in this set has a dyadic expansion of d1(ω)d2(ω).
For instance, d1(2) = 1 and d2(2) = 0. If dt(ω) = 1, ω means that a technology
was adopted at period t. For example, the natural number 1 means that technol-
ogy adoption happened only at the second period since its dyadic expansion is 01.
There are ten ways of technology adoption of two players over two periods.12 We
categorize them into the following four groups.
(1) Diﬀusion: If a player used the same level of technology as the other player
had used before, it appears that the technology diﬀused among them. Hence we
term this behavioral pattern diﬀusion. The player who had adopted ﬁrst is called
leader, and the other one who adopted later follower. The leader has to use new
technologies with no social experience. On the other hand, the follower can utilize
information obtained through the observation of the leader’s using the technology.
{1,2} and {1,3} belong to the diﬀusion.
(2) Separation: Another pattern of community’s technology adoption is the
separation, where a player adopted a new technology and the other did not any.
The social experience of using a new technology is useless to the player who kept
using the initial technology. {0,1}, {0,2}, {0,3} are classiﬁed as the separation.
(3) Unison: There is a case where both the players adopted the same level
of technology at the same time. We call this case unison. When the two players
use the same technology in unison, they can collect more information about the
technology than they use it alone. {1,1}, {2,2}, {2,3}, {3,3} are grouped into
the unison.
12They are {0,0}, {0,1}, {0,2}, {0,3}, {1,1}, {1,2}, {1,3}, {2,2}, {2,3}, {3,3}.
8(4) Deepening: If both the players do not adopt any new technologies,
they can deepen their skills of using the initial technologies. Hence, we call this
behavioral pattern deepening. Only {0,0} is the deepening.
3. How would your Neighbor’s Education Level Aﬀect you?
In this section, we show the eﬀects of your neighbor’s education level on your
output level. There are player i and player j in our game. In this section, the
eﬀects of the rise of ej on player i are examined. All the proofs for the propositions
are given in appendix A.
Each member’s education level has inﬂuence on his own behaviors of technology
adoption. Each member’s behaviors of technology adoption determine the com-
munity’s accumulation of the social experience, on which each member’s level of
expected output depends. Hence, a member’s higher level of education aﬀects the
other member’s output level.
Positive Externalities by the Diﬀusion A member’s higher level of education
is likely to induce technology progress. The diﬀusion may accompany it and may
be favorable to all.
Proposition 1ɿIf ei < min{e∗
0,e∗
1} and e(4,1) < ei, ej < e∗
0 implies the deep-
ening and ej > e∗
0 implies the diﬀusion where player i follows player j. Player i’s
expected outcome is higher in the latter than in the former.
This proposition shows that the rise of ej may work better oﬀ to player i holding
ei constant. When ej is higher than e∗
0, it is better for player j to adopt a new
technology at the ﬁrst period if player i does not. Given player j’s adoption of
a new technology, it may be desirable for player i to delay the adoption so as to
observe player j’ using the technology. This is the pattern of the diﬀusion. Since
player i can enjoy technological progress with observation on player j’s production
activities with a high level of technology , the output level of player i can be better
than the deepening.
Negative Externalities by the Diﬀusion The diﬀusion does not always ben-
eﬁt all the members in the community. When the education level of the follower
is low, the diﬀusion is not preferable to the deepening for the follower.
Proposition 2ɿIf ei < min{e∗
0,e∗
1} and e(3,1) < ei < e(4,1), ej < e∗
0 implies
the deepening and ej > e∗
0 implies the diﬀusion where player i follows player j.
Player i’s expected outcome is lower in the latter than in the former.
New technologies are used in the diﬀusion, and therefore less amount of the
social experience is accumulated for the initial level of technology in the diﬀusion
9than in the deepening. The social experience counts more for less educated people.
Hence less educated people prefer the deepening.
Negative Externalities by the Separation New technologies do not always
diﬀuse. Those whose education level is very low keep using the initial technology
alone even though the other members adopt new ones.
Proposition 3ɿIf ei < min{e∗
0,e∗
1} and ei < e(3,1), ej < e∗
0 implies the deep-
ening and ej > e∗
0 implies the separation where player i does not adopt any new
technologies. Player i’s expected outcome is lower in the latter than in the former.
In the diﬀusion, the follower adopts a new technology at the second period. If
the follower’s education level is low, however, it is better not to do. This is the
case of the separation. At this time, lowly educated people are ought to keep using
the initial one alone. Consequently, the accumulation of the social experience for
the initial level of technology becomes less. Hence, the separation is less desirable
to lowly educated people than the deepening.
Positive Externalities by the Unison If people in a community are all highly
educated, they may adopt a new technology in unison at the ﬁrst period.
Proposition 4ɿWhen ei > max{e∗
0,e∗
1}, ej < e∗
1 implies the diﬀusion or the
separation, ej > e∗
1 implies the unison. Player i’s expected outcome is higher in
the latter than in the former.
This proposition applies, for example, when those who are lowly educated get ed-
ucated and the diﬀerence of education becomes narrower. Since ei > max{e∗
0,e∗
1},
player i adopts a new technology at the ﬁrst period. When ej is less than e∗
1, player
j does not adopt a new technology at the ﬁrst period. On the other hand, if ej
is more than e∗
1, all the players adopt a new technology together at the ﬁrst pe-
riod. Thereby the social experience for technology level 1 accumulates more. The
advantage of the unison lies in this intensive accumulation of the social experience.
Who are Exposed to Negative Externalities? The discussions about the
negative externalities by the diﬀusion and by the separation gives us the following
corollary. The corollary shows that there are negative externalities from which
only backward groups may suﬀer. Hence if the education level of members in a
community is low, the policies which enhance the education level for only a part
of members may be inappropriate.
Corollary: Assume that ei < min{e∗
0,e∗
1}. If ei < e(4,1), player i is worse oﬀ
when ej > e∗
0 than when ej < e∗
0. To the contrary, if ei > e(4,1), player i is better
oﬀ when ej > e∗
0 than when ej < e∗
0.
10Those whose education level is low are likely to be exposed to negative external-
ities. Disadvantaged people tend to get worse because of the backwardness. This
is an illustration of a vicious circle.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the consequences of the rise of the neighbor’s
education level. We can summarize the results in terms of the diﬀerence in the
education levels of the members in a community. The heterogeneity of the ed-
ucation levels may cause diﬀerent behaviors of technology adoption between the
members in a community.13 When technologies are used heterogeneously, the ac-
cumulation of the social experience disperses over the various levels of technology,
and thereby the amount of accumulation per technology becomes less. The social
experience matters more to those whose education level is low, and therefore they
are subjected to negative externalities by the wider gap in the education levels.
13The change from the deepening to the separation or the diﬀusion is an example.
11Appendix A
Lemma for the existence of e∗
k
LemmaɿThere exists e∗
k ∈ [0,e(2,0)] such that a player with education level
more than e∗
k should adopt a new technology at the ﬁrst period, given the other




























1k(e) increases more with e than v∗
0k(e). If v∗
1k(e) = v∗
0k(e) at some real value








0k(e) for e between 0 and e(2,0), e(2,0) is appropriate for the value of
e∗
k. We can therefore construct e∗
k. ˙
Proofs for the Propositions




11 in the following proofs.
They are deﬁned in the proof of the lemma.
(1) Proof of proposition 1, 2, and 3
Assume ei < min{e∗
0,e∗
1}. Under this assumption, k∗
i = 0.
(a) k∗







j) = 0, the technology adoption




j = 1 if ej > e∗
0.
If ei > e(3,1), l∗
i(k∗
i,k∗
j) = 1. The adoption pattern on this SPNE is the diﬀusion.
Player i’s payoﬀ is v∗
01(ei). v∗
01 > v∗
00(ei) if ei > e(4,1). On the other hand,
v∗
01(ei) < v∗
00(ei) if ei < e(4,1). Thus proposition 1 and 2 are proven.
If ei < e(3,1), l∗
i(k∗
i,k∗
j) = 0. The separation is the adoption pattern on this
SPNE. Player i’s payoﬀ is v∗
01(ei). v∗
01(ei) < v∗
00(ei) if ei < e(3,1). Thus proposition
3 is proven. ˙
12(2) Proof of proposition 4
Assume ei > min{e∗
0,e∗
1}. Under this assumption, k∗
i = 1.
(a) k∗
j = 0 if ej < e∗
1. Player i’s payoﬀ is v∗








The adoption pattern on this SPNE is the separation.
(b) k∗
j = 1 if ej > e∗
1. The adoption pattern on this SPNE is the unison. Player
i’s payoﬀ is v∗
11(ei). v∗
11(ei) > v∗




In this appendix, we examine whether or not an equilibrium is social optimal.
This appendix does not directly show the social optimal path given initial edu-
cation levels but compare diﬀerent cases. We show that the SPNE is not social
optimal under certain conﬁgurations. We assume that e∗
k is neither 0 nor e(2,0),
and therefore e∗
0 and e∗
























Ineﬃcient Deepening If e(4,1) < ei < min{e∗
0,e∗
1} and ej < e∗
0, the deepening
is an equilibrium whereas the diﬀusion is not. However, the deepening is inferior
to the diﬀusion if ej is near enough to e∗
0. Player i is better oﬀ in the diﬀusion
than in the deepening. On the other hand, player j is worse oﬀ in the diﬀusion
than in the deepening by
f(ej) ≡ δr(0,2,ej) + δ
2r(0,4,ej) − δr(1,0,ej) − δ
2 max{r(1,1,ej),r(2,0,ej)}.
f(ej) becomes less than player i’s improvement if ej is near enough to e∗
0 because
f : R++ → R is a continuous function and f(e∗
0) = 0.
Ineﬃcient Diﬀusion If ei < min{e∗
0,e∗
1} and e(3,1) < ei < e(4,1) and ej > e∗
0,
the diﬀusion is an equilibrium whereas the deepening is not. However, the diﬀusion
is inferior to the deepening if ej is near enough to e∗
0. Player i is better oﬀ in the
deepening than in the diﬀusion. On the other hand, player j is worse oﬀ in the
deepening than in the diﬀusion by |f(ej)|. |f(ej)| becomes less than player i’s
improvement if ej is near enough to e∗
0.
13Ineﬃcient Separation If ei < min{e∗
0,e∗
1} and ei < e(3,1) and ej > e∗
0, the
separation is an equilibrium whereas the deepening is not. However, the separation
is inferior to the deepening if ej is near enough to e∗
0. Player i is better oﬀ in the
deepening than in the separation. On the other hand, player j is worse oﬀ in the
deepening than in the separation by |f(ej)|. |f(ej)| becomes less than player i’s
improvement if ej is near enough to e∗
0.
Another Ineﬃcient Diﬀusion If ei > e∗
0 and e(3,1) < ej < e∗
1, the diﬀusion is
an equilibrium whereas the unison is not. However, if ej is near enough to e∗
1, the
diﬀusion is less desirable than the unison. Player i is better oﬀ in the unison than
in the deepening. On the other hand, player j is worse oﬀ in the unison than in
the diﬀusion by
g(ej) ≡ δr(0,2,ej) + δ
2r(1,1,ej) − δr(1,0,ej) − δ
2r(1,2,ej).
g(ej) becomes less than player i’s improvement if ej is near enough to e∗
1 because
g : R++ → R is a continuous function and g(e∗
1) = 0.
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